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I. Introduction
On June 23, 2005, the United States Supreme Court decided Kelo v. City
ofNew London' and reignited the debate over the proper role of property rights
and the power of eminent domain. There was considerable backlash.
According to Congressman Phil Gingrey, the majority decision in Kelo "placed
a for-sale sign on the doorstep of every American home or business; 2 Justice
O'Connor, in her dissent to Kelo, noted that the majority decision "effectively
[deleted] the words 'for public use' from the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 3  The decision, however, practically invited legislative
reexamination of eminent domain,4 which has been followed by a scholastic
reconsideration of how much the government should be able to interfere in
economic matters.5 The scholastic debate Kelo sparked was as heated as the
one between the majority and the dissent.6 Even before Kelo, there were some
1. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005) (determining that economic
development qualifies as "public use" under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
2. 151 CONG. REc. H5370 (daily ed. June 29, 2005) (statement of Rep. Gingrey).
3. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
4. See id. at 489 (majority opinion) ("We emphasize that nothing in our opinion
precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.").
5. See Richard A. Epstein, The Public Use, Public Trust & Public Benefit: Could Both
Cooley and Kelo Be Wrong?, 9 GREEN BAG 2d 125, 125 (2006) (stating that Kelo had two
unintended consequences: (1) significant public outcry, and (2) systematic scholarly
consideration of the role of government and the economy).
6. See, e.g., Walter Block, Coase and Kelo: Ominous Parallels and Reply to Lott on
Rothbardon Coase, 27 WHITTIER L. REv. 997, 997 (2006) (criticizing Kelo insofar as it follows
the line of thinking of Ronald Coase that where there are transaction costs, the proper role of the
judiciary is to enhance societal welfare and make the "best use"of the property); David L.
Callies, Kelo v. City of New London: Of Planning, Federalism, and a Switch in Time, 28 U.
HAw. L. REv. 327, 344 (2006) (noting that the legislative backlash following Kelo represents
"[flederalism exercised with a vengeance"); Daniel H. Cole, Why Kelo Is Not Good News for
Local Planners and Developers, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 803, 847 (2006) (arguing that
legislatures rather than courts better protect property rights); Gideon Kanner, Kelo v. New
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clearly drawn sides in the public use debate; in broadest terms, the eminent
domain debate comes down to a balance between efficiency and equity.
7
Those on the side of efficiency typically point to the impossibility of
efficiently purchasing large parcels of land on the open market.8 Because land
is unique, property owners have a monopoly and can, absent the power of
eminent domain, extract monopoly prices for their land.9 Typical market
negotiations would result in very high transaction costs, making whatever
project a buyer intends cost prohibitive.' 0 Market imperfections allow at least
one party to extract rents from the other and to reduce ultimate social welfare."
For this reason, the efficiency camp argues that the government should
maximize welfare by using eminent domain to channel the property into its best
use.12 Judge Posner provided a very qualified defense of the Kelo decision, but
expressed frustration that the Court did not consider the hold out problem.
13
The equity side of the debate, which is generally the larger camp, tends to
center around the argument that a liberal use of eminent domain will allow a
London: Bad Law, Bad Policy, and Bad Judgment, 28 URB. LAW. 201, 206 (2006)
(characterizing Kelo as "Hood Robin" by taking from the poor and giving to the rich); Peter G.
Sheridan, Kelo v. City of New London: New Jersey's Take on Takings, 37 SETON HALL L. REV.
307, 324-32 (2007) (outlining changes to New Jersey's takings law and public use interpretation
as resulting from Kelo). But see generally Joseph L. Sax, Kelo: A Case Rightly Decided, 28 U.
HAW. L. REv. 365 (2006) (arguing that in terms of constitutional law there is no principle on
which public use can be differentiated from public purpose).
7. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1214-24 (1967) (exploring
the dichotomy in "just compensation" between utility and fairness).
8. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics ofPublic Use, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 61, 74-75
(1986) ("[E]minent domain applies where market exchange, if not impossible to achieve, is
nonetheless subject to imperfections.").
9. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 55 (6th ed. 2002) (stating that
one persuasive argument for eminent domain is to prevent monopoly, and referring to the hold
out problem as one type of monopoly).
10. See Michelman, supra note 7, at 1174-75 (arguing that it is difficult to create
voluntary arrangements that fully account for the costs of bargaining and strategic concealment
in activities of public investment and that such difficulty justifies collective coerced action).
11. See Merrill, supra note 8, at 76 ("[T]he underlying predicament is the same: market
conditions allow the seller to seek economic rents, that is to charge a price higher than the
property's opportunity cost.").
12. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. ECON 1, 16 (1960) (arguing that
the legal system ought to arrange rights in such a way as to achieve the greater productive value
of property).
13. See Richard A. Posner, The Kelo Case, Public Use, and Eminent Domain-Posner
Comment, Becker-Posner Blog, 5, 8 (June 26, 2005), http://www.becker-posner-
blog.com/archives/2005/06/ (last visited March 5, 2007) (arguing that the hold out problem is
the only justification for eminent domain but noting that the Court did not discuss whether there
had been a hold out problem in Kelo) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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government or those acting with the power of government to unjustly acquire
property.14 Within the typical parade of horribles, such as those expressed by
Justice O'Connor, 5 lies the worry that a broad application of eminent domain
is not only subject to abuse but actually creates incentives to avoid the
marketplace and good faith negotiations altogether. 16 Richard Epstein suggests
incorporating the theory of public goods to clarify and limit the concept of
public use, 17 although he modifies the concept slightly by focusing on the right
to consume even if everyone cannot consume simultaneously, thus broadening
the concept of public goods to include common carriers.' 8 Justice Thomas in
his separate dissent in Kelo echoed Professor Epstein's sentiment.19 Others
advocate a complete ban on economic takings in order to eliminate the ability
of special interests to wield the power of government in oppressive takings.2°
14. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV.
957, 968 (2004) ("Small numbers of transferees raise the specter of manipulation of the political
process by those wielding disproportionate concentrated power."); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The
Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 934,952-53 (2003) (noting
that in some cases urban renewal programs were used to remove African-Americans from
certain neighborhoods); Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown: County of Wayne v. Hathcock,
Economic Development Takings and the Future of Public Use, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1005,
1014-16 (2004) (arguing that a lack of binding post-condemnation requirements on new owners
leads to a danger of eminent domain abuse).
15. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,501 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with
a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory.").
16. See STEVEN GREENHUT, ABUSE OF POWER: How THE GOvERNMENTMISUSEs EMINENT
DOMAIN 6 (2004) ("Whatever the plan is, it is far easier to use government police power to
scrape away existing properties than it is to follow the rule of law and the rule of the
marketplace .... ").
17. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 166-69 (1985) (arguing that the theory of public goods could clarify the poorly
understood and ambiguous concept of public use).
18. See id. at 168 ("So long as all individuals have the right to use the facility ... then the
public use requirement is satisfied, even if all individuals cannot simultaneously use it.").
19. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 508 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The most natural reading of the
Clause is that it allows the government to take the property only if the government owns, or the
public has the legal right to use, the property as opposed to taking it for any public purpose or
necessity whatsoever.").
20. See, e.g., Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An
Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 491, 543
(2006) ("The only way to mitigate [the efficiency and fairness] concerns sufficiently is by
banning economic development takings altogether."); Inst. for Justice, White Paper, Kelo v. City
of New London: What It Means and the Need for Real Eminent Domain Reform 6 (2005),
http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/Kelo-WhitePaper.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2007) (including
an explicit prohibition against commercial development takings among "the basic elements of a
good [eminent domain] law").
1622
IMMINENTLY EMINENT
In an effort to find a balance between efficiency and equity with regard to
eminent domain, this Note uses tools of game theory to examine the incentives
created by various regimes as well as the strategies of actors reacting to those
incentives. Game theory is the study of interactions between rational
decisionmakers who are aware that their actions affect each other.21 The
hypothetical models studied in game theory may seem unrealistically and,
perhaps, inappropriately simple in some respects; however, the simplicity of a
model allows the game theorist to distill the situation to its most fundamental
conflict and gain insight into how people are likely to behave in the real life
conflict that the game attempts to model.22 A central goal of the application of
economics to the law is to understand how rules affect behavior.23 Apart from
the simple "prisoner's dilemma," the use of game theory in legal reasoning is
still fairly new but growing.24 Indeed, Derek K. Yonai is the first to use game
theory beyond the prisoner's dilemma in modeling the effect of Kelo.25
Professor Yonai, however, examines the interaction between a developer and
the government, whereas this Note concentrates on how different regimes affect
the incentives involved in interactions between developers and property
21. See ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY
11 (4th ed. 2007) (describing the purpose of the field of game theory).
22. See ROGER B. MYERSON, GAME THEORY: ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT 2 (1991) (describing
game theoretic models generally).
23. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 4 (1994) (describing the
application of game theory to the law).
24. See Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the Law, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1291, 1292 (1990)
(describing how game theory has been "slower to diffuse into legal reasoning than other
economic contributions"). For applications of game theory to legal problems, see generally
BmIRD ET AL., supra note 23; Manel Baucells & Steven A. Lippman, Justice DelayedIs Justice
Denied: A Cooperative Game Theoretic Analysis of Hold-Up in Co-Ownership, 22 CARDOzO L.
REV. 1191 (2001); Lucien Ayre Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect
Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404 (1984); Robert Cooter, Stephen Marks & Robert Mnookin,
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL
STUD. 225 (1982); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game
Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. CN. L. REv. 347 (1991); Jason Scott Johnston,
Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615
(1990); Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and Law
of Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L. REv. 215 (1990); Robert J. Mnookin & Robert B. Wilson,
Rational Bargaining and Market Efficiency: Understanding Penzoil v. Texaco, 75 VA. L. REv.
295 (1989); I.P.L. P'ng, Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial, 14 BELLJ. EcoN. 539
(1983); Martin Shubik, A Game Theorist Looks at Antitrust Laws and the Automobile Industry,
8 STAN. L. REv. 594 (1956); Derek K. Yonai, Kelo and the Games People Play: A Game
Theoretic Analysis of Kelo v. City of New London, 29 CAMPBELL L. REv. 83 (2006).
25. See Yonai, supra note 24, at 99-107 (using a signaling game of incomplete
information to examine how developers might interact with government when seeking
condemnation).
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owners. Professor Yonai's article does, however, provide a springboard for
further analysis of the effects of the hold out problem and transaction costs.
26
This Note attempts to examine the issue of eminent domain using tools
from game theory. Part II discusses the history and current state of eminent
domain in the United, States. Part III uses game theory first to examine the
problems that eminent domain attempts to solve and then to develop a
general game theoretic model for the use of eminent domain. Part IV uses
the basic model to determine which of the various post-Kelo proposals lead to
a better outcome given the concerns of both efficiency and fairness. Finally,
Part V concludes that adjusting the compensation models provides a better,
though imperfect, solution than adjusting interpretations of public use. Part
V also notes a few policy and logistical considerations attendant to that
conclusion.
As much as eminent domain jurisprudence tries to balance efficiency
and equity, a Note of this nature must balance readability with technical
rigor. In order to accommodate both considerations, this Note must include a
Mathematical Appendix that lays out, step by step, the mathematical
reasoning alluded to in the body of the text. Readers who are mathematically
inclined or wish to verify the Note's assertions may do so without setting up
the equations on their own. Similarly, readers who are less mathematically
inclined may read the body of the Note to understand its ideas without being
bombarded with equations and Greek letters.
II. Kelo v. City of New London and Eminent Domain
In order to determine which eminent domain structure provides the most
efficient outcomes, both in terms of the use of property and ease of
administration, it is helpful to begin with a broad overview of both the history
and current state of eminent domain. Part II.A provides a brief survey of the
history of eminent domain in the United States by looking primarily at
Supreme Court public use cases. Part II.A also examines two prominent
public use cases from Michigan, which provide a unique contrast to each
other. Part II.B outlines the various legislative reactions to the decision of
Kelo v. City of New London.
26. See id. at 99 (describing the assumptions of the analysis, including assumptions that
no hold out problem exists and that a developer incurs no costs in seeking condemnation).
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A. Eminent Domain Jurisprudence and What Kelo Changed
Kelo is merely one of the most recent and most publicized decisions in a
fairly well-established line of eminent domain jurisprudence dealing
specifically with takings for economic development.27 Although the history of
eminent domain stretches back into antiquity, 28 a natural starting point for
discussion of eminent domain for economic development in the United States is
the Mill Acts29 of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 30 The Mill Acts
allowed a mill owner to construct a dam to power a mill, although the dam
flooded his neighbors' land and rendered the land unusable, so long as the
condemning owner paid damages.3' Courts found the grist mills to be public
and upheld the Mill Acts because regulations required them to be open to any
paying customers. 32 Maryland's Mill Act of 1719, 33 however, took the first
step towards private-to-private takings by extending its mill protections to
privately owned mills for iron production.34 Furthermore, as the Industrial
Revolution progressed, fewer mills were the grist mills used by local farmers as
contemplated by the original Mill Acts, and more mills were privately owned
and operated saw mills, pulp mills, and foundries.35 Courts continued to
27. See Cohen, supra note 20, at 500-16 (describing the history of the public use
doctrine); see also Alberto B. Lopez, Weighing and Reweighing Eminent Domain's Political
Philosophies Post-Kelo, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 237, 255-72 (2006) (discussing the evolution
of the public use doctrine).
28. See Errol E. Meidinger, The "Public Uses" of Eminent Domain: History and Policy,
11 ENVTL. L. 1, 6-8 (1980) (describing eminent domain in ancient Rome and the civil law
jurisdictions); see also William V. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH.
L. REv. 553, 553-56 (1971) (noting that King Ahab's seizure of Naboth's vineyard in 1 Kings
21 may be the first recorded exercise of eminent domain).
29. See Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9,26 n.2 (1885) (listing the Mill Acts from
each state in the United States at the time of the decision).
30. See Lopez, supra note 27, at 256 (discussing the evolution of the public use doctrine
in the context of private beneficiary takings with the Mill Acts).
31. See Meidinger, supra note 28, at 14-15 (giving an overview of the Mill Act in the
colonial era); id. at 23 (noting that the seven colonial Mill Acts bad grown to twenty-nine by
1884).
32. See Nathan Alexander Sales, Classical Republicanism and the Fifth Amendment's
"Public Use" Requirement, 49 DUKE L.J. 339, 373 (1999) (noting that grist mills were not
purely private because they were required to grind the grain for all citizens).
33. An Act for the Encouragement of an Iron Manufacture, Within this Province (June 8,
1719), ch. 15, Prov. St. 1719 (Md. 1719) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
34. See Cohen, supra note 20, at 502 (describing Maryland's Mill Act of 1719).
35. See Meidinger, supra note 28, at 23 (commenting on the increased privatization of
mills in the industrial revolution).
1625
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1619 (2007)
uphold such protections for private mills by reasoning that mills provided a
public benefit similar to railroads and canals.36
In the mid-nineteenth century, a countermovement in the public use
doctrine arose, interpreting public use more narrowly to mean "use by the
public. 37 Whether the countermovement ever became the majority view is in
debate, but the narrower view of public use gained considerable support in the
38courts. Nonetheless, the push toward development in the late nineteenth
century saw a record number of private corporations using the power of
eminent domain, which held up under both the broad and narrow views of
eminent domain. 39 Railroads and other infrastructural projects that enjoyed the
power of eminent domain easily passed the public use requirement, and the
development of widespread transportation led to an accelerated industrial
development.40
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the narrow interpretation of
public use as "use by the public" became nothing more than a rhetorical
obligation, or at best, only a minor hurdle to the use of the eminent domain
power.4' Indeed, in 1916, the Supreme Court formally rejected the narrow
view, stating that "[t]he inadequacy of use by the general public as a universal
test is established. 4 2 Little more than a decade later, the Great Depression
created widespread economic distress that led to an unprecedented focus on
urban redevelopment.43 Such redevelopment programs led to the landmark
36. See Cohen, supra note 20, at 506 (outlining the rationale used to uphold the private
takings that occurred in the construction of dams for private mills); see also Harry N. Scheiber,
Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by Government: The United States,
1789-1910, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 232, 237 (1973) (noting the broadening of"public use" in the
Industrial Revolution to include railroads, turnpikes, bridges, and canals).
37. See Meidinger, supra note 28, at 24 (identifying the gradual shift of the interpretation
of "public use" in some jurisdictions).
38. See Cohen, supra note 20, at 507 (discussing the scholarly disagreement about how
prevalent the narrow view eventually became); see also Lopez, supra note 27, at 259-60
(describing late nineteenth century criticism of the broad interpretation of public use by judges
and legal commentators).
39. See Meidinger, supra note 28, at 28 (observing that the push for development
counterbalanced the "ostensible tightening of the public use requirement").
40. See id. ("Now that broad transportation and substantial industrial sectors had been
developed, the country entered a period of accelerated industrial development that would...
prove to be unprecedented.").
41. See Cohen, supra note 20, at 508-10 (describing the state of the public requirement at
the beginning of the twentieth century).
42. Mt. Vemon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Ala. Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30,
32(1916).
43. See Meidinger, supra note 28, at 33 (describing early uses of eminent domain for the
purpose of slum clearance).
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decision in Berman v. Parker.44 In Berman, the Supreme Court examined an
act that allowed the government to "employ[] all means necessary and
appropriate" to address "conditions existing in the District of Columbia with
respect to substandard housing and blighted areas., 45 Petitioners argued that
because their property was commercial and not "slum housing," and because
the project was to be managed by a private agency, the redevelopment plan was
for private rather than public use.46 The Court found that the act served
legitimate ends in that it ensured public health, safety, and morality.47 The
Court then stated that because the ends were within the authority of the
legislature, "the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is
clear" because "eminent domain is merely the means to the end.
' 48
In Berman, the Court adopted a very light standard of review for
government determinations that a proposed project satisfies the public use
requirement. 49 Furthermore, the Court also endorsed a broad interpretation of
public use as "public welfare. 50  Once the Court found that the legislative
purpose for using eminent domain was to make the District of Columbia both
sanitary and beautiful, it stated that "[t]here is nothing in the Fifth Amendment
that stands in the way."5' The Court also determined that the city may
redevelop the area as a whole, even if some property taken "standing by itself,
is innocuous and unoffending.,
52
Thirty years later, the Court decided the case of Hawaii Housing Authority
v. Midkiff,53 again affirming the broad understanding of public use.54 In
Midkiff, the Court considered whether the Takings Clause of the Fifth
44. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (finding that a revitalization and
development project designed to remove blight satisfied the public use requirement).
45. Id. at 28.
46. See id. at 31 (outlining the petitioner's argument).
47. See id. at 32 (describing traditional applications of the police power).
48. Id. at 33.
49. See id. at 32 ("[Wjhen the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared
in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary is the main
guardian of public needs to be served by social legislation.").
50. See id. at 33 (using the "broad and inclusive" concept of"public welfare" to determine
if legislative ends are legitimate when exercising the power of eminent domain).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 35.
53. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1984) (finding that the use of
eminent domain to address the problems of highly concentrated land ownership did not violate
the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment).
54. See id. at 244 ("The Court long ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned
property be put into use for the general public.").
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Amendment allowed Hawaii to use the power of eminent domain to redress
the concentration of land ownership in the state.55 The Court noted that
Berman compels significant deference to the legislature when determining
questions of public use.56 The Court then noted that the extremely
concentrated land ownership in Hawaii had significant negative effects on the
residential property market. 57 The Court stated that "[r]egulating oligopoly
and the evils associated with it is a classic exercise of a State's police
powers."58 After finding that the purpose of the act was legitimate, the Court
found that the act's approach to the problem was a rational one. 59 The Court
would not review whether the use of the eminent domain power was likely to
accomplish the public purpose and thus explicitly endorsed a rational basis
review of takings cases.6 °
One of the most prominent state decisions endorsing a very broad
interpretation of public use is Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of
Detroit.61 In Poletown, the Michigan Supreme Court upheld a taking "to
alleviate and prevent conditions of unemployment and fiscal distress.,
62
Because the benefit to the residents of invoking eminent domain to assist in
economic development was clear, the court found that the project was a
legitimate object of the legislature.63 The court relied on an interpretation of
public use that was broader than that in Berman. Berman concerned urban
blight-which, as the Supreme Court famously remarked, "suffocate[s] the
55. See id. at 232-33 (explaining the problem of highly concentrated land ownership in
Hawaii).
56. See id. at 240 (noting that Berman found that the role ofjudicial review of takings is a
narrow one).
57. See id. at 242 ("The land oligopoly has, according to the Hawaii Legislature, created
artificial deterrents to the normal functioning of the State's residential land market and forced
thousands of individuals to lease, rather than buy, the land underneath their homes.").
58. Id.
59. See id. ("Nor can we condemn as irrational the Act's approach to correcting the
problem.").
60. See id. at 241 ("But where the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally
related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to be
proscribed by the Public Use Clause.").
61. See Poletown Neighbor'd Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 459 (Mich.
1981) (finding that the condemnation of a large tract of land for transfer to a private corporation
for an assembly plant satisfied the public use requirement because of the positive economic
effects), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004).
62. Id. at 458.
63. See id. at 459 (explaining that because the public was to receive a clear benefit from
the economic development, such benefit was sufficient to satisfy the public use requirement).
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spirit by reducing the people who live there to the status of cattle"64-while
Poletown dealt with unemployment.65 The court found that the benefit of
boosting the economy to be sufficiently within the public interest to satisfy
Michigan's public use requirement, and that the benefit to a private interest
was merely incidental.66
Twenty-three years later, the Michigan Supreme Court revisited the
issue in County of Wayne v. Hathcock.67 This time around the court looked
at the development takings more skeptically.68 The court first found that
Michigan's takings statute authorized the taking, but that the limitations of
the state constitution applied to the taking regardless. 69 The court determined
that the constitutional inquiry was whether the condemnation at issue was
"consistent with the common understanding of 'public use' at [the time of
Michigan's current constitution's] ratification" in 1963.70 After reviewing its
pre-ratification eminent domain jurisprudence and Justice Ryan's dissent to
Poletown, the Michigan Supreme Court determined that Poletown was an
anomaly and should be overruled.7' The court tightened the public use
requirement in Michigan, only allowing it in three circumstances: (1) the
creation of instrumentalities of commerce; (2) the requirement that the
recipient remain accountable to the public in its use; or (3) the elimination of
a public concern such as blight.72 This, however, caused substantial
uncertainty because a number of other courts had cited Poletown as support
64. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
65. See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 459 ("The power of eminent domain is to be used in the
instance primarily to accomplish the essential public purposes of alleviating unemployment and
revitalizing the economic base of the community").
66. See id. ("[T]he benefit to be received by the municipality invoking the power of
eminent domain is a clear and significant one and is sufficient to satisfy this Court... even
though a private party will also, ultimately, receive a benefit as an incident thereto.").
67. See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004) (overruling
Poletown and prohibiting the use of eminent domain for economic development takings).
68. See id. at 786 ("Before Poletown, we had never held that a private entity's pursuit of
profit was a 'public use' for constitutional takings purposes simply because one entity's profit
maximization contributed to the health of the general economy.").
69. See id. at 778 (finding that although the taking was authorized under Michigan takings
statutes, such was not the end of the inquiry).
70. Id. at 781.
71. See id at 787 ("We have concluded that this Court's Poletown opinion is inconsistent
with our eminent domain jurisprudence and advances an invalid reading of our Constitution.").
72. See id. at 781-83 (listing the three circumstances in which Michigan's pre-Poletown
jurisprudence allowed the use of eminent domain to transfer property to a private party).
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for the more expansive view of public use, 73 a development that encouraged
those who argue against the use of eminent domain in development takings.74
The Supreme Court once again weighed in on the issue of public use and
development takings less than a year after Hathcock when it decided Kelo v.
City of New London.75 After decades of decline, in February 1998, the
pharmaceutical company Pfizer Inc. announced a $300 million research facility
to be built in the New London Area, which would draw new business to the
area.76 The New London Development Corporation (NLDC) proposed an
integrated development plan, and the city council authorized the NLDC to use
the power of eminent domain in the city's name.77 Several homeowners in the
area to be redeveloped refused to sell, and the NDLC initiated condemnation
proceedings.78
The Court acknowledged that a state may use eminent domain to transfer
property to private actors if public use is the purpose of the taking; however, a
state may not take property under the pretext of public use when the actual
purpose is to bestow a private benefit.79 The Court defined public use as
"public purpose" and noted that it is the purpose rather than the mechanics of
condemnation that determine whether a use is public.80 The Court refused to
adopt the bright line rule that economic development does not qualify as public
use because promoting economic development is a "traditional and long
73. See, e.g., Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1, 12 (Nev. 2003)
(citing Poletown for the proposition that "creating a significant increase in jobs in an area
suffering from high unemployment" satisfies the public use requirement despite its effects on
current businesses in the area).
74. See Lopez, supra note 27, at 268-69 (explaining how Hathcock affected eminent
domain jurisprudence outside of Michigan).
75. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 (2005) ("[T]he question
presented is whether the city's proposed disposition of this property qualifies as a 'public use'
within the meaning of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.").
76. See id. at 473 (noting the conditions that led to the city of New London implementing
the redevelopment plan).
77. See id. at 475 (stating that the city authorized the NLDC to exercise the power of
eminent domain for the purposes of the development plan).
78. See id. ("[The NLDC's] negotiations with petitioners failed. As a consequence, in
November 2000, the NLDC initiated the condemnation proceedings that gave rise to this case.").
79. See id. at 477 ("[I]t has long been accepted that the sovereign may not take the
property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is
paid just compensation.").
80. See id. at 482 ("'[lIt is only the taking's purpose, and not its mechanics,' we
explained, that matters in determining 'public use."' (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467
U.S. 229, 244 (1984))).
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accepted function of government," and because the pursuit of a public purpose
will often benefit private parties as well.8'
In her vigorous dissent, Justice O'Connor, joined by three other justices,
argued that "[u]nder the banner of economic development, all private property
is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another owner, so long as it
might be upgraded. 82 Justice O'Connor distinguished the situation at issue in
Kelo from the cases of Berman and Midkiffby pointing out that in both Berman
and Midkiff, a social harm was being rectified: (1) blight in Berman, and
(2) market skewing highly concentrated land ownership in Midk if.83
The majority's interpretation approaches that of Poletown but falls just
short. The plan at issue in Kelo also included a pedestrian "riverwalk" and
provided parking and retail services to support either a nearby public park or
the nearby marina, which would satisfy even narrow interpretations of public
use.84 The majority opinion, however, also indicates some discomfort with the
possible implications of its holding by "emphasiz[ing] that nothing in [the]
holding precludes any State from placing further restrictions on exercise of the
takings power," citing Hathcock as an example.85
An understanding of the history of public use in the United States is useful
for several reasons. First, it illustrates that the interpretation of public use by
the courts has not always marched in one direction. Although the end of the
nineteenth century saw a tightening of the concept of public use, shifting from
the fairly broad interpretation that courts used to uphold the Mill Acts,86 the
twentieth century saw a widening once again of the Supreme Court's
interpretation of public use.87 Secondly, the examination of Poletown and
Hathcock illustrates two very different-indeed almost diametrically
opposed-interpretations of public use, made even more interesting by the fact
81. See id. at 484 (deciding against the petitioner's request "to adopt a new bright-line
rule that economic development does not qualify as 'public use"').
82. Id. at 494 (O'Conner, J., dissenting).
83. See id. at 500 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The Court's holdings in Berman and
Midkiff were true to the principle underlying the Public Use Clause.. . a public purpose was
realized when the harmful use was eliminated.").
84. See id. at 474-75 (outlining the plan for the condemned land at issue).
85. Id. at 489.
86. See Meidinger, supra note 28, at 23-33 (describing the various shifts in the
understanding of the public use requirement during the nineteenth century).
87. See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2006) (upholding the use
of eminent domain for the purpose of economic development); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff,
467 U.S. 229 (1984) (finding eminent domain a permissible means to remedy highly
concentrated land ownership that adversely affected the housing market); Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26 (1954) (allowing the use of eminent domain to rectify urban blight).
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that they arose from the same court.88 Finally, it is important to note the
consistent emphasis of the fact that courts are loathe to scrutinize the use of
eminent domain very strictly: A court will only overturn the legislature's grant
of eminent domain in cases demonstrating the most egregious abuse.
Therefore, any procedural changes will likely have to come from legislatures.89
B. Reactions to Kelo
Disappointing petitioners, Kelo was not a federal version of Hathcock.
Nonetheless, Kelo may have done almost as much to tighten public use
requirements at the state level as if it had been decided the other way.90 On
June 30, 2005, a week after the Kelo decision, the United States House of
Representatives passed House Resolution 340 by an overwhelming majority,
which formally condemned the decision.91 Similarly, many state legislatures
reacted in horror to the decision, and introduced many bills to limit the power
of eminent domain.92 Reactions to Kelo have fallen broadly into two
88. Compare Poletown Neighbor'd Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455,458-59
(Mich. 1981) (describing the purpose of alleviating unemployment as sufficient to satisfy the
public use requirement in a private-to-private taking), with County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684
N.W.2d 765, 783 (Mich. 2004) (restricting the use of eminent domain in private-to-private
takings to three limited circumstances).
89. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 32 ("[W]hen the legislature has spoken, the public interest
has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary,
is the main guardian of public needs to be served by social legislation.").
90. See Patricia E. Salkin, Swift Legislative (Over)Reaction to Eminent Domain: Be
Careful What You Wish For, SM004 ALI-ABA 865, 867 (2006) ("[T]his article examines some
of the various legislative approaches that have been offered and concludes that more thoughtful
consideration must be given to the short-term and long-term consequences of the various
proposals.").
91. See H.R. Res. 340, 109th Cong. (2005) (enacted) (expressing congressional
disapproval of the Kelo decision).
92. See, e.g., H.R. 318,24th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2005) (enacted) (prohibiting the use
of eminent domain for economic development but allowing for certain narrow exceptions); H.R.
1411, 65th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006) (enacted) (requiring the condemning entity to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the taking is for public use and stipulating that
economic development does not constitute sufficient public use); H.R. 1010, 114th Leg., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Ind. 2006) (enacted) (prohibiting condemnations for economic development and establishing
a greater than market value compensation scheme); Legis. Doc. 1870, 122d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess.
(Me. 2006) (enacted) (prohibiting the use of eminent domain for the purpose of economic
development and providing an exception for the elimination of blight); S. 881, 189th Gen.
Assem., 2005-2006 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005) (enacted) (banning private-to-private transfers
except when the private entity occupies an incidental area within a public project, such as
retail space, for common carriers, for eliminating blight, or to provide low income housing);
S. 3296, 104th Gen. Assem., 2005 Sess. (Tenn. 2005) (enacted) (stipulating that economic
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categories: (1) restrictions of eminent domain based on purpose, and
(2) valuation and compensation requirements.93
1. Restrictions Based on Purpose
Most of the proposals offered since the Kelo decision have been
restrictions of eminent domain based on the purpose of the project
seeking condemnation, although few go about it the same way. 94 For
instance, legislation in some states lists specific types of development
that do not satisfy the public use requirement, 9 while legislation in other
states generally prohibits the use of eminent domain for economic
development. 96 Utah, however, passed a bill that, although increasing the
procedural requirements for the use of eminent domain, actually expands
the definition of "public use" to include bicycle paths and sidewalks. 97
development does not constitute "public use," but among the typical exceptions for blight or
common carriers, also allows the a local government to use eminent domain for an industrial
park); S. 246, 2005 Leg., 68th Biennial Sess. (Vt. 2005) (enacted) (prohibiting the use of
eminent domain for economic development except pursuant to Vermont's urban renewal
statute).
93. See Salkin, supra note 90, at 869-72 (describing the various types of state legislative
reactions to Kelo).
94. See id. at 869-70 (noting that a majority of the states either restrict eminent domain
for economic development or redefine "public use").
95. See, e.g., S. 68, 2005 Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Ala. 2005) (enacted) (prohibiting
condemnation for the "private retail, office, commercial, industrial, or residential
development"); H.R. 2351, 81st Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2006) (enacted) (excepting
"increased employment opportunities, privately owned or privately funded housing and
residential development, privately owned... commercial or industrial development" from
"public use"); S. 881, 189th Gen. Assem., 2005-2006 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005) (enacted) ("[T]he
exercise ... of eminent domain to take private property in order to use it for private enterprise is
prohibited.").
96. See, e.g., H.R. 318, 24th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2005) (enacted) ("The power of
eminent domain may not be exercised... [for] economic development purposes."); H.R. 1411,
65th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006) (enacted) (excepting the purpose of economic
development or enhancement of tax revenue from "public use"); S. 7, 79th Leg. Sess. (Tex.
2005) (enacted) (forbidding the use of eminent domain for the purpose of economic
development).
97. See S. 117, 56th Leg., 2004 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2006) (enacted) ("This bill expands the
public uses for which eminent domain may be used to include bicycle paths and sidewalks
adjacent to paved roads.").
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By far, the most popular method has been to take a cue from Hathcock98 and
limit "public use," such that economic development is either explicitly insufficient
or given increased scrutiny.99 An example of one of the more comprehensive
proposals is Minnesota's modification to its eminent domain statute. 1° The bill
explicitly provides that "[t]he public benefits of economic development, including
an increase in tax base, tax revenues, employment, or general economic health, do
not by themselves constitute a public use or public purpose, '' 0° and defines
"public use" and "public purpose" to mean:
[E]xclusively: (1) the possession, occupation, ownership, and enjoyment of
the land by the general public, or by public agencies; (2) the creation or
functioning of a public service corporation; or (3) mitigation of a blighted
area, remediation of an environmentally contaminated area, reduction of
abandoned property, or removal of a public nuisance.'
0 2
The Minnesota bill further requires that, in takings for blight or environmental
contamination, the condemner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that a taking is necessary for the designated public use.'0 3 Minnesota's proposal
also includes specific procedural and compensation requirements that will be
discussed in the following section.l14
On the other end of the spectrum lies those legislatures that failed to pass
any eminent domain abuse bills or those whose bills were vetoed.' °5 New
98. See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 682 N.W.2d 765, 783 (Mich. 2004) (limiting
"public use" to three contexts: (1) where the hold out problem threatens the "public necessity of
an extreme sort;" (2) where the property remains subject to public oversight; and (3) where the
developer selects the property for facts of "independent public significance").
99. See, e.g., S. 217, 143d Gen. Assem., 1st Spec. Sess. (Del. 2005) (enacted) (limiting
the use of eminent domain for recognized public uses and providing an exception for easements
for public utilities); H.R. 1313, Gen. Assem., 2006 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006) (enacted) (restricting
"public use" to eliminating blight, providing for common carriers, and appropriating land for
use by the government or other public entities); Legis. Doc. 1870, 122d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess.
(Me. 2006) (enacted) (barring the use of eminent domain "[flor the purposes of private retail,
office, commercial, industrial or residential development"); S. 881, 189th Gen. Assem., 2005-
2006 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005) (enacted) (banning private-to-private transfers except when the
private entity occupies an incidental area within a public project, such as retail space, for
common carriers, for eliminating blight, or to provide low income housing).
100. S. 2750, 84th Leg., 2006 Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2006) (enacted) (amending 117 Minn.
Stat. §§ 025, 036, 055, 075, 085, 51, 52 (2004) and repealing 117 Minn. Stat. 011 (2004)).
101. Id. §2(11)(b).
102. Id. § 2(11)(a).
103. See id. § 8(1)(b) (requiring a particular evidentiary standard in actions pursuant to the
blight or environmental public purpose).
104. See id. §§ 3-12 (setting forth procedural and compensation requirements for the use
of eminent domain).
105. See DANA BERLINER, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: EMINENT DOMAIN ABuSE INA POST-
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Mexico Governor Bill Richardson's veto message is indicative of the concerns of
those skeptical of such swift limitations on public use. First, the veto message
worries that a bill prohibiting the use of eminent domain for economic
development would hinder prosperity in rural areas of the state. 106 Secondly,
the bill might make it difficult to engage in projects necessary for public health,
safety, and welfare.0 7 Finally, such requirements may make it difficult to
convert abandoned or rundown properties that may not reach the definition of
blight.'08
2. Procedural and Compensation Requirements
The second type of proposal outlines administrative procedures and
compensation models designed to minimize the possibility that a Kelo-type
taking might occur. 10 9 For instance, Minnesota's proposal requires the
condemnor to acquire and present to the owner an appraisal of the property at
the time of the offer and to pay up to $1,500 of the costs of the owner's own
appraisal of the property." 0 Minnesota's bill then sets forth requirements of a
public hearing before a local governing body, allowing reasonable time for the
property owner to present testimony."' A proposal in Virginia would require a
mandatory dispute resolution evaluation session following the initiation of
KELo WORLD 7 (2006) (stating that as of June 2006, Virginia had failed to pass any eminent
domain reform bills); see also H.R. 746, 47 Leg. Sess., 2d Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2006) (restricting
the use of eminent domain for the purpose of economic development); House Executive
Message No. 138 (N.M. 2006), available at http://www.governor.state.nm.us/legislative/2006
legislation/house/HEM 138.pdf [hereinafter N.M. Executive Message No. 138] (vetoing New
Mexico House Bill 746, which would have prohibited economic development takings).
106. See N.M. Executive Message No. 138, supra note 105, at 2 (noting the anxiety of
leaders in small towns and rural areas that the bill would impede development).
107. See id. 4 (expressing the concern that the bill would hamper the construction of
highways and other infrastructural developments).
108. See id. 5 (stating that the bill would make the removal of blight more difficult).
109. See, e.g., H.R. 1010, 114th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006) (enacted) (creating notice
and hearing procedures for the condemnation of property and requiring compensation of greater
than market value at varying rates depending on the current use of the land); H.R. 2351, 81st
Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2006) (requiring greater notice and hearing procedures in
condemnation actions and requiring the acquiring party to pay costs and reasonable attorney's
fees to the condemnee); S. 323, 81st Legis. Assem., 2006 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2006) (enacted)
(setting compensation at greater than market value); S. 2750, 84th Leg., 2006 Reg. Sess. (Minn.
2006) (enacted) (initiating new notice and procedural requirements for condemnation and
providing new compensation schedules, including attorney's fees, for various types of property).
110. See Minn. S. 2750, § 5 (setting forth "appraisal and negotiation requirements").
111. See id. § 6 (creating notice and public hearing requirements in condemnation actions).
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condemnation. 112 Many state legislatures have proposed bills that require a
developer or redevelopment agency to have a specific and comprehensive plan
before initiating condemnation proceedings." 3 Yet another proposal would
give the condemnee the right to reacquire the condemned land under certain
circumstances." 14 However, this may turn out to be of only nominal interest to
the residential property owner whose house has already been destroyed.
Although most proposals set forth administrative procedures, Idaho goes a
step further and requires that a jury determine whether an action constitutes
proper public use.'l 5 One proposal in Maryland would allow either condemnor
or condemnee to seek a trial within ninety days, which would take precedence
on the civil docket. 116 Another procedure considered by a number of states
would require not only an administrative determination, but also legislative
approval of the taking. 117 For example, the Florida legislature proposed an
amendment to the state constitution requiring a three-fifths vote of both
legislative houses to approve a private-to-private taking." 
8
Several schemes have been proposed to amend the meaning of "just
compensation." ' 9 Unlike the more ambiguous definition of public use, the
112. See H.D. 631, Gen. Assem., 2006 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2006) ("Following the filing of a
petition initiating a condemnation proceeding, the court shall refer the matter to a dispute
resolution orientation .. ").
113. See, e.g., S. 53, Gen. Assem., 2005 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006) (enacted) ("This bill would
require redevelopment plans to contain a description of the agency's program to acquire real
property by eminent domain, including prohibitions, if any, on the use of eminent domain.").
114. See H.D. 898,421st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2006) (requiring that if condemnor
decides to sell property acquired through the use of eminent domain, condemnor must first offer
it to the condemnee).
115. See S. 1273, 59th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2006) (amending procedural
requirements in condemnation actions).
116. See H.D. 961, 421st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2006) ("[A]n action for
condemnation shall be set for trial within a certain period of time after the case is at issue and
shall take precedence over all other civil cases.").
117. See Assemb. 8865, 228th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2006) (requiring a vote by local
government for the acquisition of property for use by a private developer).
118. See H.R.J. 1569, 108th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006) (amending the state constitution
to require more stringent approval of private-to-private takings).
119. See, e.g., H.R. 1010, 114th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006) (enacted) (setting just
compensation at above market value at varying rates depending on current use); S. 2750, 84th
Leg., 2006 Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2006) (enacted) (including attorney's fees in just compensation
and providing for an increase in compensation for takings of a "going concern"); see also Steve
P. Calandrillo, Eminent Domain Economics: Should "Just Comensation" Be Abolished, and
Would "Takings Insurance" Work Instead?, 64 OIo ST. L.J. 451,451 (2003) (arguing that "just
compensation" creates the incentive for landowners to excessively improve land and that takings
insurance might be a superior alternative); James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses,
2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 859, 871 (2004) (advocating "gain-based compensation," which would
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definition ofjust compensation has almost always been synonymous with fair
market value. 120 The traditional definition of fair market value, and thus just
compensation, has been:
[T]he highest price on the date of valuation that would be agreed to by a
seller, being willing to sell but under no particular or urgent necessity for so
doing, nor obliged to sell, and a buyer, being ready, willing, and able to buy
but under no particular necessity for so doing, each dealing with the other
with full knowledge of all the uses and purposes for which the property is
reasonably adaptable and available.121
Such a definition of fair market value and just compensation is problematic for
several reasons. First, fair market value contemplates voluntariness that is not
present in the forced transfers requiring eminent domain. 22  Second, fair
market value does not take into account any sentimental or other such value that
an owner may place upon his property beyond what the market might normally
bear. 23 The literature often refers to this additional value as the "subjective
premium," a term this Note shall adopt.
124
The subjective premium in Kelo may indeed have been quite high; one of
the petitioners, Wilhelmina Dery, lived in the house in which she was born and
that had been in her family for over a century. 25 This high subjective premium
has prompted some legislatures to adjust upward the compensation a property
owner would receive for condemned property. Such proposals would give
owners greater than 100 percent of fair market value, with the exact amount
compensate property owners based on the value of their property in proportion to the gain the
condemnor expects from the project).
120. See Lopez, supra note 27, at 280 ("[T]he amount that dispossessed owners have
received in exchange for property has invariably equaled the value of the land taken for a public
use.").
121. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1263.320(a) (Deering 2005).
122. See Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis ofEminent Domain, 84 J. POL. ECON. 473,
473 (1976) ("[E]minent domain... is the legal right to acquire property by forced rather than
[by] voluntary exchange.").
123. See Krier & Serkin, supra note 119, at 865 (explaining that the practical difficulties in
assessing the subjective value of a property is why owners are not indifferent to condemnation).
124. See Merrill, supra note 8, at 83 ("['Just compensation'] does not compensate [an
owner] for the subjective 'premium' he might attach to his property above its opportunity
cost."); see also Cohen, supra note 20, at 538 ("This premium may include sentimental
attachment, unique suitability of the property to the owner's needs, relocation costs, replacement
costs of the land and improvements, consequential damages to the retained property, attorney's
fees, lost business revenue goodwill, or going-concern value."); Fennell, supra note 14, at 963
("Most property owners value their property above market value; if they did not, they likely
would have sold it already.").
125. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,494 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(explaining the sentimental value to owners of some of the properties at issue).
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depending on various factors, such as type of property or length of time the
126current owner has owned the property. For example, Indiana considered a
proposal that would give owners of condemned property the higher of either
150 percent of the assessed value of the property, or the average of three
independent property value appraisals.127 Other proposals also include items
incidental to condemnation in just compensation. Minnesota requires the
condemnor to pay the condemnee's attorney's fees related to the condemnation
if the condemnee shows the offer to be too low. 128 An Idaho proposal provides
for a relocation payment of between $2,500 and $10,000 to business owners. 
129
It seems clear that legislatures have responded to Justice Steven's
invitation to limit eminent domain. 30 This overview of legislative proposals
suggests that in determining which regime offers the better outcome, it is useful
to look at one which restricts public use and another which increases
compensation. These post-Kelo proposals, though often very different in the
details, fall into one of these two categories. Although it may not be possible
(nor would it be useful) to analyze every single proposal made since the Kelo
decision, these categories represent a useful starting point for inquiry.
I1. A Game Theoretic Model of Eminent Domain
This Part will use game theory to analyze the hold out problem and how
eminent domain solves the hold out problem. The essential characteristics of a
game theoretic model are players, actions, payoffs, and information. 131 Because
game theory assumes that players are rational and intelligent, they choose
126. See, e.g., H.R. 1010, 114 Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006) (enacted) (setting
"just compensation" at above market value and at varying rates depending on current use); S.
323, 2006 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2006) (enacted) (obligating the legislature to consider compensation
of at least 200% of the fair market value of property condemned for economic development).
127. See Lopez, supra note 27, at 291 (outlining a proposal considered by the Indiana
House of Representatives).
128. See S. 2750, 84th Leg., 2006 Reg. Sess. § 4 (Minn. 2006) (enacted) (requiring the
court to award attorney's fees if the final judgment is 40% above the final offer of compensation
and giving the court discretion to award such fees if the final judgment is 20% greater than the
final offer).
129. See S. 1152, 58th Leg., I st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2005) ("Any displaced person who
moves or discontinues a business ... shall receive a fixed location payment ... not less than
[$2,500] nor more than [$10,000].").
130. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489 ("We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any
State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.").




actions to maximize their expected payoffs. 32 Payoffs are measured in utility,
which is not necessarily equivalent to monetary value and thus can incorporate
subjective values such as sentiment or risk-aversion. 3 3 Information is a crucial
aspect to the game because it affects the strategies each player is likely to
employ, and includes not only the player's knowledge of the expected payoffs
but also knowledge of the actions other players have taken previously.
34
Information therefore gains central importance in games where players move in
sequence, such as the bargaining game that will be the starting point for
analysis of eminent domain.135 The players' information sets do not need to be
symmetric, meaning that no player has any information different from other
players. 136 Indeed, in the models examined by this Note, neither player knows
exactly the other player's valuation of the property. Similarly, uncertainty can
be introduced into the models by making "chance" a player who selects a
particular state of the world, with or without the knowledge of the other players,
or by simply discounting the final payoffs.1
37
At its core, the model will have two players-a Developer and an Owner.
Owner has a house on land that Developer would like to develop. Developer
values the house at 175. Owner may value his home at market price, 100, or
the Owner may have a subjective premium, with Owner valuing the house at
200. The basic order of play is as follows: (1) Developer offers price pl;
(2) Owner either accepts or rejects pl; (3) if Owner rejects pl, Developer may
quit bargaining or offer price p 2; (4) if Developer offers price P2, Owner either
accepts or rejectsp 2; (5) if Owner rejectsp 2 and the Developer has the power of
eminent domain, Developer may then choose either to do nothing or to
condemn.
132. See MARTIN J. OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME THEORY 4 (1994)
(explaining that "rational behavior" requires that the player is "aware of his alternatives, forms
expectations about any unknowns, has clear preferences, and chooses his actions deliberately
after some process of optimization").
133. See MYERSON, supra note 22, at 3 (noting that payoffs are not necessarily measured in
monetary value); L.C. THOMAS, GAMES, THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 18-19 (1984)
(demonstrating the process of selecting payoffs to reflect preferences and utility).
134. See RASMUSEN, supra note 21, at 23 (describing information sets generally).
135. See id. at 45-49 (noting that when players move in sequence, the information
structure becomes important because it affects players' choices).
136. See id. at 51 (defining asymmetric information as one in which at least one player has
private knowledge not shared by the others).
137. See OSBORNE & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 132, at 101-02 (allowing for exogenous
uncertainty by making "chance" a player); RASMUSEN, supra note 21, at 51 (noting that it is
possible to eliminate "chance" as a player by discounting the payoffs in accordance with the
probability of the outcome).
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The price and valuation of the property by each party determines the
respective payoffs. Furthermore, in a two-period model, it makes sense to
factor in a loss from a delay in agreement, and the simplest way to capture that
loss is to make it a fixed cost on the second round. 138 The loss from delay
could be anything from a monetary penalty resulting from waiting (like losing a
preferential interest rate), to the disutility of having to deal with the other party
for a longer time. It is not important to specify the actual source of the cost;
rather, it is only necessary to recognize a cost of delay as a factor in the payoff
schedule. 139 If Owner accepts the first offer, Owner gets a payoff (p, - vo),
which represents the price Owner receives (p,) less her valuation (vo) of the
property. Developer receives (VD - Pl), which represents the value of the
property to Developer (VD) less the price he paid for it (pi). If Owner rejects the
first offer and Developer does nothing, the payoffs are 0 to Owner and -2 to
Developer. Developer's negative payoff represents the cost of delay. If Owner
accepts the second offer, the payoffs are (P2 - Vo) to Owner and (VD -P2 - 2 ) to
Developer. Even if Owner accepts the second offer, there has been a delay and
Developer must still incur that cost. If Owner accepts no offer, then the payoff
for Owner is 0, and the payoff for developer is -4, which represents an
additional cost of delay.140  Finally, the game ends after two rounds of
bargaining because more rounds of bargaining unnecessarily complicates the
analysis.' 41 This Note will first examine the hold out problem. Then, in order
to mimic eminent domain, the model will give Developer the ability to force the
sale should bargaining fail.
A. The Hold Out Problem: Bargaining with a Low Valuation Owner
The hold out problem is one of the classic efficiency justifications for
eminent domain. 142  Accordingly, for purposes of understanding whether
138. See OSBORNE & RuBINsTEIN, supra note 132, at 137-38 (explaining the effect and
necessity to discount games that occur over time). Using a discount rate would create a model
more mathematically complex than is necessary for the purposes of this Note. This Note,
therefore, will subtract a fixed cost if the first round of bargaining fails.
139. See RASMUSEN,supra note 21, at 361-62 (noting that a delay cost maybe appropriate
because bargaining occurs over real time).
140. See id. at 361 (describing the players' payoffs in a two-period bargaining game with
incomplete information).
141. See id. at 362 (noting that adding another round of bargaining to the model makes the
model more complex).
142. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 9, at 55 (stating that a good argument for eminent
domain is as a solution to the hold out problem); Cohen, supra note 20, at 534 ("Without the
power of eminent domain, thin markets may make the acquisition of property prohibitively
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eminent domain is actually necessary, it is important to look at actors'
incentives if eminent domain were not available. Because a hold out is distinct
from someone with a high subjective value, in the hold out game, Owner will
have a low valuation of her property. 143 Figure 1 depicts the hold out problem
in the game tree form, starting at the left.
Figure 1
Offer PDecline Offer IP Decline
i- 'Vo 0 2 -Vo
The final outcome ultimately depends on the Developer's valuation of the
property. A low valuation Owner with no cost of delay will not accept anypi.
Owner will be willing to rejectp, if she thinks that there exists any chance that
Developer might increase the offer in the second period. Because Owner loses
nothing by holding out, it is always in her best interest to hold out for a higher
offer.'4
Even if Developer offers Owner p, > 100, Owner still may expect
Developer to go higher in Period 2, and Owner, therefore, has nothing to lose
by waiting. The question for Developer is whether to offer the same price or a
higher price in Period 2. Developer does not know Owner's valuation, and thus
does not know if Owner rejected just because she is holding out or if she has a
higher valuation than pl. If Developer offers a higher price (P2 >P1), Owner is
more likely to accept because Owner receives a payoff greater than the payoff
from rejecting.
expensive, because of monopoly pricing by the sellers who 'hold out' .....
143. See Meidinger, supra note 28, at 49 ("[T]he [hold out] problem is defined as a seller
holding out for a higher price from a buyer known to be 'assembling' properties for a particular
configuration... than the seller would ask from a buyer not suspected of planning such an
assembly.").
144. Infra Mathematical Appendix: Explanation 1 p. 1654; see also RASMUsEN, supra note
21, at 361 (describing the players' payoffs in a two-period bargaining game with incomplete
information).
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Developer, on the other hand, gets a negative payoff if the deal fails, but a
positive payoff if the deal succeeds. Developer will almost always offer a
higher price in Period 2 even if Developer thinks he has a good chance that
Owner might choose to accept the same price. 145 Knowing that Developer will
offer a higher price in Period 2, Owner will always hold out in Period 1.
Developer's signals as to whether he is more or less likely to offer a higher
price for the property in Period 2 are not credible. 146 If Owner thinks that there
is even a 1% chance that Developer will offer a higher price in Period 2, then
Owner will hold out.
Two consequences follow from Owner's holding out: (1) Owner captures
the welfare surplus from the Developer, and (2) the society, consisting of
Developer and Owner, incurs a deadweight loss. For example, if vD = 175, and
the Owner accepts a first price of 100, the total surplus is 75. The surplus goes
entirely to Developer. If Owner holds out and Developer offersp 2 = 150, then
the parties share the total surplus. Owner gets 50, and Developer gets 23, but
total welfare is reduced to 73. Although Owner is now better off, the result is
Pareto-inefficient because she made Developer worse off and reduced the total
welfare. 1
47
This inefficiency compounds in a development situation in which
Developer deals with several owners in a "thin market.', 148 For example,
suppose Developer wants to purchase ten adjacent lots owned by different
145. Infra Mathematical Appendix: Explanation 2 p. 1655.
146. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 23, at 130 (noting that in pooling equilibria in games of
private non-verifiable information, actions do not convey any information); ROBERT GIBBONS,
GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS 50-51 (1992) (describing credibility of threats).
Developer does not have the ability to credibly signal to Owner that his valuation of the
property (and therefore willingness to offer a higher price in Period 2) is low. Developer would
never find it beneficial to signal to Owner that his valuation is high and that he is more likely to
increase his offer in the second round. Such a signal would ensure that the bargaining reaches
Period 2, resulting in the cost of delay. Thus, Owner will not be able to rely on any signals
indicating a low vD value, regardless of the accuracy of such signals. Similarly, Owner cannot
signal to Developer how likely she is to accept an offer to which she is indifferent between
accepting and rejecting. Owner would never signal that she has a high probability of accepting
such an offer because it would discourage Developer from offering a higher offer in Period 2.
Any signal to Developer that Owner would very rarely or never accept an offer ofp 2
= 100 is
therefore not credible.
147. See Allen M. Feldman, Pareto Optimality, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS 5, 6 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (defining Pareto-efficiency as the "point
from which no move can be made that would increase the welfare of some individuals and make
no one worse off').
148. See Merill, supra note 8, at 76 (defining a "thin market" as one in which an owner's




Owners for his project. When Developer approaches the owner of the final lot,
Ownerl0, the market is incredibly thin, consisting of only one parcel. Owner10
would be irrational not to hold out and extract as much of the surplus from
Developer as possible. Using backwards induction, Owner9, the owner
Developer approached before Ownerl0, realizes that Owner10 would be able to
hold out and get a higher price and also capture some of the surplus. Owner9
likewise holds out. This remains true all the way to Owner2, who sees that
because Developer purchased Ownerl's lot, Developer essentially locked
himself in to the location. Furthermore, Owner1 would have the same incentive
to hold out that just a single Owner faced in the hold out game. The incentive
to hold magnifies if the location of Ownerl's property uniquely suits
Developer's project. The entire project thus unravels, and because the owners
of all ten lots are holding out and eating away at Developer's surplus,
Developer no longer has an incentive to carry out his project.
B. Adding the Power of Eminent Domain to Solve the Hold Out Problem
In the hold out game, once the Developer makes an offer, both parties are
stuck in the game, and they must either reach a bargain or incur losses.' 49 In
real bargaining situations, alternatives more attractive than incurring losses
exist, and legal rules often shape those alternatives. 150  Eminent domain
provides such an alternative because it allows the state to use police power to
force the exchange for a public purpose.
151
Once again there are two players, Developer and Owner, and Owner
values her property at market price. Absent the power of eminent domain,
Developer would face the possibility of a hold out. The order of play is the
same as in the hold out game; however, Developer now has the option after
Period 2 to force Owner to sell for some "just compensation" price C.
Developer may not force the sale at price C until after Period 2 because
many eminent domain statutes require the party seeking to use the power to
first engage in good faith bargaining. 152 Price C is fair market price unless
149. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 23, at 224 ("In the simple... bargaining game, the
players do not have any alternatives to striking a deal.").
150. See id. (describing how "many legal rules do not affect the bargaining, but rather the
alternatives each party has to continuing negotiations").
151. See Munch, supra note 122, at 473 ("Eminent domain ... is the legal right to acquire
property by forced rather than [by] voluntary exchange.").
152. Id. at 473. Ms. Munch writes:
When a buyer seeking to acquire a property has the power of [eminent domain], he
must first attempt to negotiate a voluntary sale. But if his highest offer is rejected,
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otherwise noted. 153 The payoffs are the same as in the hold out problem,
except that if Owner declines P2, Developer has the option to force the sale
at price C. If Developer does not exercise the option to force, then the deal
fails and Developer receives a payoff of (-4) and Owner receives a payoff
of 0. If Developer exercises the option to force the sale then both
Developer and Owner must incur additional costs, denoted CD for
Developer and co for Owner. 154 Owner's payoff is (C - Vo - co), and
Developer's Payoff is (VD - C - CD). The cost to Developer is 8, and the
cost to Owner is 6. Figure 2 shows the game in the game tree form.
Figure 2
Offer P, Decline Offer Decline /-,Condemn v]3 - C- cs
D 0 D 0 D c..o
>z
J e
VD -P1 -2 vDB- p - 2 -4
Pi- wo 0 FZ -Vo 0
At this point it is useful to explain a game theoretic tool called "backwards
induction." Backwards induction is a process of starting at the end of the game
to determine what the players would do if they reached that point and using that
answer to determine what the players would do at the point in the game
immediately preceding, and so forth.155 The tool relies on the presumption that
players will look ahead to see what the other players are likely to do. Based on
that information, each player will determine what his own best actions should
be, both in response and anticipation. 1
56
he may condemn the property, that is, obtain a forced sale at a price determined by
a court of law.
Id.
153. See Lopez, supra note 27, at 280 ("[The amount that dispossessed owners have
received in exchange for property has invariably equaled the value of the land taken for a public
use.").
154. See Merrill, supra note 8, at 77-78 (describing the "due process costs" of eminent
domain). This Note considers the costs higher for Developer than Owner because the due
process costs are higher for the party trying to exercise eminent domain. Id. Owner's additional
costs may involve either the defense against an eminent domain action or even just the disutility
of losing.
155. See OSBORNE & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 132, at 99-100 (explaining the concepts of
subgame perfection and backwards induction).
156. See GIBBONS, supra note 146, at 57-61 (demonstrating the logic behind backwards
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When Developer faces a low valuation Owner, Owner values the property
at the market rate. Assume that the market value of the property is 100, and
thus C = Vo = 100.157 Starting from the end, Developer will force the sale so
long as his payoff from forcing is greater than giving up. 158 Owner will accept
any price greater than 94 (which is the sum of C - co), because then Owner will
save at least some of the cost of defending the action.1 59 Developer's best
strategy would be to offer P2 = 95. If Owner always accepts P2 > C - co, then
Developer has no reason to offer a P2 that is much greater than 94.
Recall that in the hold out game Owner was willing to reject pI if there
was any chance that Developer would offer a higher price in Period 2.160 In this
game, however, Developer always offers P2 = 95. Moving back to Period 1,
Owner would have no reason to hold out unless Developer offered p, < 95.
Developer gains nothing by trying to lowball in period one and offering 94
instead of 95, because Developer suffers the cost of delay.' 6' Developer will
therefore offerpi = 95. Developer knows that Owner will acceptp 2 > C- CO,
but will not increase his offer beyond 95. Owner, knowing she will gain
nothing by holding out, will accept the offer in Period 1. Allowing Developer
to force the exchange anyway cures the inefficiencies presented by the hold out
problem. The Owner, who has a low valuation of his property, is no longer
able to capture Developer's surplus and create a deadweight loss; however,
things are not as optimal if Developer faces a high valuation Owner.
If Owner has high valuation of her property, that valuation modifies
Owner's payoffs, but not Developer's. The best that a high valuation Owner
can do in the game is accept an offer of p, = C - co. If Developer can force
the sale, Owner will not do better by rejecting pl, and thus will accept
Developer's offer in Period 1. Knowing that even a high valuation Owner will
accept p, = 95, Developer will not increase his offer even if he suspects that
Owner has a high valuation of the property. The property goes to Developer
for a price less than market value, although Owner valued it above market
induction).
157. See Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403,408 (1878) ("The inquiry in such cases must
be what is the property worth on the market."); see also United States v. 563.54 Acres of Land,
441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) ("The Court therefore has employed the concept of fair market value
to determine the condemnee's loss."); Lopez, supra note 27, at 278-82 (noting that courts have
consistently interpreted "just compensation" to be market value).
158. Infra Mathematical Appendix: Explanation 3 pp. 1655-56.
159. Infra Mathematical Appendix: Explanation 4 p. 1656.
160. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (demonstrating why an Owner would
rationally hold out).
161. Infra Mathematical Appendix: Explanation 5 p. 1656.
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value. Developer has captured part of Owner's surplus. Although there is no
deadweight loss, many view this result as inequitable. 1
62
C. Adding Uncertainty of Success to the Model
Developer may not always be able to use the power of eminent domain,
and therefore, it is necessary to add a final element of uncertainty to the use of
eminent domain. 163 0 represents the probability that Developer will be
allowed to use eminent domain to force the transfer, and (1 - 0) represents
the probability that Developer will not. Multiplying 0 by the payoff from
being able to force the sale discounts the payoff to account for the uncertainty
of success. Similarly, multiplying the probability that Developer will not be
allowed to use eminent domain, (1 - 0), by the cost of seeking the action
yields the amount Developer can expect if the court rejects the use of eminent
domain. Adding these two together results in the expected payoff to
Developer for initiating condemnation proceedings and alters the final
payoffs to be O(vD - C - cD) + (1 - )(-cD) for Developer, if Developer
chooses to force eminent domain. Moreover, Owner faces the same
uncertainty if Developer initiates condemnation proceedings. Thus, Owner's
payoff becomes O(C - Vo - co) + (1 - 0)(-co). Figure 3 illustrates the final
game in extensive form.
Figure 3
Ofe , Decline Offer P Decline Condem
D(c-,C -cW)+ (I - ex-c.)
VD -PI V- q - 2 -4
P- e- 2- V-o0 pzo0
162. See generally GREENHUT, supra note 16 (arguing that the use of eminent domain for
private-to-private transfers is an abuse of government power).
163. See City of Norwood v. Homey, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1123 (Ohio 2006) (finding that
facilitating economic development is an improper use of eminent domain); but see Talley v.
Housing Auth. of Columbus, 630 S.E.2d 550, 552-53 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding summary




IV. Analysis of the Post-Kelo Proposals
Using the model developed in Part III, this Note now examines the
proposals set forth in Part II to determine which proposal provides the best
outcome. The dilemma to be considered is that although the use of eminent
domain solves the hold out problem and encourages development, it also calls
property rights into question and can be inequitably abused. 164 This Part first
considers the restrictions based on purpose by setting the value of 0,
Developer's chance of success, at 25%, which represents a very restrictive
interpretation of public use, as opposed to the 100% success rate analyzed in
Part III.B. This Note then examines the effect of switching the costs associated
with defending against condemnation from Owner to Developer. Finally, this
Part examines the effects of adjusting the value of C to be higher than market
value.
A. Restrictions Based on Purpose
Banning economic development takings entirely, as did several
proposals, 165 eliminates the possibility of eminent domain and would result in
the hold out problem examined in Part III.A. 166 Governments may, however,
restrict the use of eminent domain in the development context by requiring
heightened scrutiny of the public use requirement. Such heightened scrutiny
would reduce the probability that courts would allow Developer to exercise the
power of eminent domain. Setting 0 to a low probability of 25% would
simulate a narrow interpretation of public use, and accordingly, a court would
be less likely to allow Developer to use eminent domain.
1. Narrow Interpretation with a Low Valuation Owner
Assume initially that Owner has a low valuation equal to fair market price
(vo = 100) and that the compensation rules require Developer to pay fair market
164. See, e.g., Somin, supra note 14, at 1021-23 (expressing the concern that the "nearly
limitless scope" and "severely constrained electoral accountability" of economic development
takings leads to a danger that special interests will be able to capture property).
165. See, e.g., H.R. 1141, 65th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006) (enacted)
(stipulating that economic development does not constitute sufficient public use); Legis. Doc.
1870, 122d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Me. 2006) (enacted) (banning the use of eminent domain for
the purpose of economic development and providing an exception for the elimination of blight).
166. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (analyzing the hold out problem).
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price (C = 100). Assume also that the costs of bringing an eminent domain
action are substantial but not prohibitive for Developer (cD = 8). Finally,
assume that Owner suffers no cost of delay from merely rejecting the offers but
does bear the cost of her defense against condemnation (co = 6).
Developer will only initiate condemnation proceedings if his expected
gains from initiating outweigh his expected gains from not initiating. For this
condition to be satisfied, vID must be high enough not only to allow Developer
to pay C and cover CD but also high enough to make Developer take the risk of
losing in court. Given a cost of condemnation of 8 and a 25% chance of
success, Developer is willing to risk losing in court if VD exceeds C by 16,
meaning that vD > 116.167 Because Developer values the property at 175, this
condition is satisfied.
Owner will hold out in Period 1 if she believes there is any possibility that
Developer will offer a higher price in Period 2. Developer, however, will be
willing to make a higher offer in Period 2 in order to avoid the cost of
condemnation. Developer will be willing to offer anything less than 162.25.168
Developer will increase his offer in Period 2 because he wants to avoid the cost
of condemnation and the uncertainty of losing. Developer also knows that
whether Owner will accept a price below C depends on Owner's belief about
Developer's likelihood of condemning. Although Owner will never acceptp 2
< 94, the more she believes that Developer will condemn, the smaller ap 2 she
will accept.'
1 69
Developer cannot influence this belief himself because his statements
about his own likelihood of success are not credible. Developer gains by
exaggerating the possibility, so Owner will assume that he is exaggerating.
Furthermore, Developer cannot ascertain Owner's belief because it is in
Owner's best interest to lie and say that she believes Developer's probability of
success to be lower than it actually is. Developer knows that Owner will
always accept P2 = C, because such an offer would save her the entire cost of
her defense.
Knowing that Owner will reject the first offer anyway, Developer will
lowball the first offer. Because P2 = 100 is the lowest price that Developer
knows Owner will accept, his first offer will be below 100. Owner will offer in
Period 2 a price equal to C to avoid the costs of condemnation. Thus, a hold
out problem is still present because a probability exists that Developer will not
be successful. The hold out problem creates the deadweight loss because
167. Infra Mathematical Appendix: Explanation 6 pp. 1656-57.
168. Infra Mathematical Appendix: Explanation 7 p. 1657.
169. Infra Mathematical Appendix: Explanation 8 p. 1657.
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Developer loses the cost of delay by his inability to close the deal in the first
round.
2. Narrow Interpretation with a High Valuation Owner
If Owner has a high subjective premium (vo = 200), but Developer's
valuation of the property is still only 175, then Developer's valuation is still
sufficient to make Developer risk losing in his condemnation proceeding.
Owner's expected payoff, should Developer initiate the proceeding, is (-31) and
0 if Developer does not. 170 If Owner accepts P2 = 100, her payoff is (-100).
This payoff is far below the expected payoff of rejecting the offer in Period 2.
Although she may lose more by rejecting P2 than had she accepted, the low
probability of Developer's success discounts that loss. The fact that there is a
sufficient probability that Owner will get to keep her property is enough to
offset the risk. A high valuation Owner therefore also has an incentive to hold
out in Period 1. Developer gets an expected payoff of 10.75.171 As a result,
total societal welfare after the game is (-17.5) when vD = 175 and vo = 200.
If, however, some rule dictated that Developer must pay the Owner's cost
of defending against condemnation, Owner will reject any price less than or
equal to the compensation rate.172  Owner would be indifferent between
accepting and rejecting. Developer must offer P2 > C before Owner would
accept. Moving to Period 1, Owner still will reject pI if she thinks there is a
possibility of getting a higher offer in Period 2. If Owner has no cost of
rejecting, she still has an incentive to hold out.
B. Compensation Above Market Value
Rather than merely adjusting the meaning of public use, some proposals
take a more nuts and bolts approach by legislatively adjusting the meaning of
just compensation. 17 3 Such plans are better at addressing the hold out problem
if not coupled with a narrow interpretation of public use. For ease of analysis,
this subpart will consider a proposal increasing the value of C to a set
170. Infra Mathematical Appendix: Explanation 9 pp. 1657-58.
171. Infra Mathematical Appendix: Explanation 10 p. 1658.
172. Infra Mathematical Appendix: Explanation 11 p. 1658.
173. See, e.g., H.R. 1010, 114th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006) (enacted)
(requiring compensation of greater than market value at varying rates depending on the current
use of the land); S. 323, 81st Legis. Assem. 2006 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2006) (enacted) (setting
compensation at greater than market value).
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percentage above market value. Analysis of a "gain-based compensation"
approach, such as that proposed by Krier and Serkin,174 would require creating
a complicated function for C, which is unlikely to provide any new insights.
The purpose of such a compensation model is to increase the amount of surplus
given to the condemnee; however, it is also important not to destroy completely
the incentives of developers.' 75 For the purposes of the following sections, this
Note assumes that 0 = 1, meaning that as long as Developer complies with the
compensation requirements, Developer will be allowed to force the transfer.
The costs of a condemnation action to Developer are the same as in the
preceding section (cD = 8). The increased cost, rather than court fees, are
attributable to the cost of appraising the property, which in many proposals is
borne by the condemnor. 176 Owner, not having to (or being able to) defend
against the condemnation of her property ordinarily would not have any cost of
condemnation, but to remove it would create doubt as to whether the effects
arise from the compensation rule or the lack of cost. Moreover, it may be
appropriate to think of Owner's cost of condemnation as representing the
disutility of dealing with the condemnation generally.
If Developer seeks condemnation, then Developer must abide by the
statutory compensation structure. This section assumes a compensation
structure such that for the type of property held by Owner, compensation would
be 150% of the fair market value appraisal (C = 150). Developer will continue
to value the property at 175, but neither player will know the other's valuation
of the property. This subpart first examines the interaction between a low
valuation Owner (vo = 100) to determine whether it addresses the hold out
problem. It then examine the interaction between Developer and an owner with
a higher valuation (vo = 200) to highlight the regime's effects on total surplus.
1. Compensation Above Market Value with a Low Valuation Owner
Developer prefers condemnation so long as his valuation of the property
covers not only the increased compensation but also the costs of complying.
Using the parameters set forth, Developer prefers condemnation to doing
174. See Krier & Serkin, supra note 119, at 871 (advocating a model in which
compensation is based on the proportion of the condemned parcel to the value of the project at
large).
175. See id. ("Changing the rule so as to distribute some or all of the surplus to
condemnees would create more robust protection against questionable projects.").
176. See, e.g., S. 2750, 84th Leg., 2006 Reg. Sess. § 5 (Minn. 2006) (enacted) ("Before
commencing an eminent domain proceeding under this chapter, the acquiring authority must
obtain at least one appraisal for the property proposed to be acquired.").
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nothing if Owner rejects P2.177 Owner should, therefore, be willing to accept
anyp2 > C - Co .178 The highest Owner could hope for from condemnation is a
payoff of 44, which is the compensation amount (150) less the costs of
defending (6) less Owner's valuation of the property (100). If Developer offers
P2 < C - co, Owner may nevertheless hold out, thus forcing the Developer to
condemn. 179 Owner may hold out because she would get a better price if
Developer condemns.
Developer prefers for Owner to accept his offer than to go through the
condemnation process. In Period 2, however, Developer is aware that Owner
knows the compensation rule and that Owner can expect a payoff of 44 if she
holds out in Period 2. If Owner has rejected any price less than C - co,
Developer will be better off offering p 2 = C- co, which isp 2 = 144. If Owner
believes there is a chance that Developer might not condemn, that possibility
discounts Owner's payoff from rejecting p2 = 144. Owner will prefer the sure
payoff of 44 by accepting p2 = 144, than the uncertain payoff of 44 from
rejectingp2 = 144. 180 As before, however, Developer does not know if Owner
believes that Developer might not condemn, and Developer cannot credibly
convey that information. Developer does know that Owner will always accept
P2> C- co, which isp 2 > 144. Developer will then offerp 2 = 145.
Moving back to Period 1, if Developer offers p, = 145, Owner will accept
because she will not be able to do any better by holding out. Owner will always
declinepj < 144 because Developer will offerp 2 > 144. The cost of delay makes it
in Developer's best interest to finish the bargain as soon as possible. Developer will
not offer a lowball price, because Owner will reject and Developer's costs will
increase. Therefore, Developer will offer p, = 145 and Owner will accept.
Developer gets a payoff of 30; Owner gets a payoff of 45; welfare surplus is 75.
Owner does not have an incentive to hold out and there is no deadweight loss; the
exchange is Pareto-efficient.181
2. Compensation Above Market Value with a High Valuation Owner
Suppose then, that Owner has a high "subjective premium" and values the
property at 200 (vo = 200). Developer still values the property at 175 (vD = 175);
the market value of the property is 100; the compensation rule is 150% of market
177. Infra Mathematical Appendix: Explanation 12 pp. 1658-59.
178. Infra Mathematical Appendix: Explanation 13 p. 1659.
179. Infra Mathematical Appendix: Explanation 14 pp. 1659-60.
180. Infra Mathematical Appendix: Explanation 15 p. 1660.
181. See Feldman, supra note 147, at 6 (defining Pareto-efficiency).
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value (C = 150). The cost of delay is 4 to Developer and 0 to Owner, and the cost
of condemnation is 8 to Developer and 6 to Owner. This game reaches the same
outcome: Developer will offerpi = 145, and Owner will accept. Developer knows
that even an owner with a low valuation would reject p, < 144. Rather than deal
with the condemnation procedures, Developer will offer a p, = 145. Owner,
knowing that she will not get her full valuation anyway, will accept rather than incur
the costs of having Developer force condemnation. Developer's payoff is 30, but
Owner's payoff is (-55), and societal welfare is (-25). The outcome is certainly
inefficient because due to Owner's high subjective premium the player who has a
lower valuation of the property gets it. The only mitigating factor might be the
downstream economic benefits created by Developer.182 This suggests that it is
unlikely that the concerns of both efficiency and fairness will be fully satisfied.
It is possible that Owner will get some utility from aggravating Developer
and forcing him to incur the cost of condemnation. Such a situation will adjust
Owner's payoff for condemnation from (C - Vo- co) to (C - vo + u), indicating
the utility of annoying the opponent. Doing so will make it more advantageous
for Owner to reject Developer's offer ofpl andp 2. Developer knows that no
rational player will accept an offer below the C- co, sop, = 145 regardless. If
Owner rejects pl, and if Developer may offer a slightly higher P2, then
Developer will offerp 2 < 154. 183 If the utility of annoying the opponent is high




At this point, it is necessary to make some policy considerations. How
much subjective premium should be enough to halt development? Two
hundred percent? Two Thousand Percent? Although a higher than market
value compensation structure will protect against the more questionable
182. See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 775-76 (Mich. 2004)
(describing the purposes of the condemnation). The court stated:
Wayne County has condemned the defendants' real properties for the following
purposes: "(1) the creation ofjobs for its citizens, (2) the stimulation of private
investment and redevelopment in the county to insure a healthy and growing tax
base..., (3) stemming the tide of disinvestment and population loss, and
(4) supporting development opportunities that would otherwise remain unrealized."
Id. (citation omitted).
183. Infra Mathematical Appendix: Explanation 16 p. 1660.
184. Infra Mathematical Appendix: Explanation 17 p. 1661.
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development, 185 no compensation rule will be able to compensate fully owners
with extraordinarily high subjective premiums. Because of the inability to
credibly signal the other players in these bargaining situations,'16 it is
impossible to determine reliably Owner's subjective premium.' 87 Banning
economic development takings will, as discussed at the beginning of Part IV.A,
result in returning to the hold out scenario described in Part III.B. Legislatures
must then balance the equity of allowing the condemnee to receive at least a
portion of her "subjective premium," the inefficiency of not fully compensating
those Owners with very high "subjective premiums," and the important societal
benefits of allowing and encouraging economic development.
The game theoretic analysis suggests that alternative compensation models
would be able to address, to some extent, the problem of subjective premium,
as well as solve the hold out problem. The less likely that Developer will
prevail in a condemnation proceeding, the more likely that Owner will see a
chance to gain surplus by holding out. Although a stricter interpretation of
public use makes it less likely that high valuation Owners will lose their
subjective premium, those that fail at the condemnation proceeding will lose it
entirely unless there is an above market price compensation model.
Compensation structures therefore more equitably split the baby. They prevent
Owner from capturing all of Developer's surplus, but also make sure Owner
receives at least part of her subjective valuation of the property above simple
market rate.
How a proper takings statute should look is beyond the scope of this Note
and requires careful consideration of the policy objectives listed above. A
legislature must make a determination as to how much compensation should be
above market value, what constitutes market value, how to allocate costs, and
whether there are differing rates for different types of property, among a host of
other questions. What the analysis suggests is that simply modifying the
definition of public use will not solve the problems attendant to eminent
185. See Krier & Serkin, supra note 119, at 871 ("Changing the rule so as to distribute
some or all of the surplus to condemnees would create a more robust protection against
questionable projects.").
186. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (describing the credibility of signals).
187. See THOMAS, supra note 133, at 200, 213-14 (noting that in an auction where the
highest bidder wins but pays only the second highest bid, the best strategy is to bid your entire
valuation rather than to shade). Although such an auction would reveal subjective valuations in
the context of eminent domain it would require condemning a property, giving Owner market
price, and auctioning it to both Developer and Owner. The only way to make sure Owner
credibly reveals her valuation would be to make Owner pay out of pocket to Developer the
amount of her subjective premium. Although efficient, it is unlikely that many would consider
such a regime to be equitable.
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domain. Legislatures must critically examine the nuts and bolts of
condemnation procedures to more equitably address the concerns raised by
Kelo v. City of New London.
VI. Mathematical Appendix
For ease of reference, this Appendix will list explanations by number
corresponding to the order with which they relate to the text.
Part I1.B. The Hold out Problem: Bargaining with a Low Valuation Owner
Explanation 1: Ifpl = 100, Owner will reason that there is a possibility 6 that
Developer will offerp 2 > 100, and if6 is sufficiently high, the low valuation Owner
would be better off waiting for the higher offer. If a player is willing to mix
strategies, his expected payoff from each strategy must be equal to his expected
payoff for every other strategy. 188 We can determine this threshold 6 by equating
the expected benefits from acceptingpi = 100 to rejectingp] = 100.189
If Owner values the property at market value and accepts pi, his payoff
function is
(p,- Vo) = (100 - 100) = 0,
and if Owner rejectspl, his expected payoff is
6(P2 - Vo) + 01- NPI-vo),
where 6 represents the probability that p 2 > pl. Setting the expected payoff of
rejectingpi to the payoff from acceptingpi gives the equation
1(P2- vo) + (1 - 6)(p - v) = (PI - vo).
Solving for 6 yields
6 = 0/ (P2-Pd.
This means that if there is any chance greater than zero percent of Developer
offering p2 > Pi, then Owner will prefer to wait for the second offer.
188. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 23, at 37 ("A player will be willing to randomize
between two strategies only if that player is indifferent as to which strategy is played.").




Explanation 2: Developer's payoff depends on the probability Vu that Owner
will accept an offer of p2 = 100 despite being indifferent between accepting and
rejecting such an offer. Developer's payoff from offering Owner P2 = p1 is
V(vD -PI - 2) + (I - y/)(-4).
By equating this with Developer's payoff from offering P2 > PI, it is possible to
solve for the threshold value of y/. 190
(vD-P2 - 2) = YIvD-p] - 2) + (1 -
Ifp2 is greater thanpl, thenP2 = P + x, where x represents some positive amount,
the equation can be written as
(VD-p - x- 2) = VD-Pl- 2 ) + (1 -y)(- 4).
Solving for y/ yields
Y/ =M[vD-p] + 2)-x]/I(vD-p] + 2) = 1-[X/I(VD-pl + 2)].
This indicates that the threshold value of V depends on several factors. Note that the
denominator of the second term is made up of the value of Developer's valuation
over the first price offered and the additional cost of the second round of bargaining.
For any x, as the Developer's valuation increases, or as the cost of bargaining
increases, the value of V gets closer to one. The same is true as x, an amount that
Developer determines, gets smaller. As V gets closer to one it means that Developer
needs more certainty that Owner will accept an offer ofp 2=p, although Owner is
indifferent between accepting and rejecting.
Even if Developer's valuation and costs are small, Developer will offer p, = p2
(which means that x = 0) only if V = 1. In other words, Developer will offer a price
in Period 2 that is greater than the offer in Period 1 unless he believes that Owner
will always accept the offer even though she is indifferent to accepting or rejecting.
Part III.B. Adding the Power of Eminent Domain to Solve the Hold
Out Problem
Explanation 3: Developer will condemn if
(vD- C- 8) > (-4),
190. See OSBORNE & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 132, at 214-15 (demonstrating the payoff
equating method).
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which simplifies to
(vD - C) > 4.
If C = 100, then Developer will force the sale so long as vD > 104.
Since vD = 175, Developer will force the sale.
Explanation 4: Rejecting P2 > 100 would net Owner an expected payoff of
y(C - vo- 6), where y is the probability that Developer will condemn. The payoff
from rejecting could never be greater than (p2 - vo) ifp > C.
Explanation 5: Developer's expected payoff ofofferingpi = 94 andp2 = 94 +
x, where x > 0 is
3 (vD- 9 4) + (1 - 6)(vD - 9 4 - 2 + x),
where 5 represents the probability that Owner will accept the offer of 94 although
she is indifferent between accepting or rejecting. Setting this expected payoff
greater than Developer's payoff of offeringp, = 94 + x and solving will determine
when Developer would prefer to offerpi = 94. The inequality is
6 (vD - 94) + (1 - 6)(VD - 94 - 2 + x) > (vD -94 + x).
Inserting vD = 175 gives
c5(81) + (1 - ) (79 + x) > (81 + x).
Solving for 6 gives
6=2/(2-x).
Ifx > 0, then 6 is greater than 1. That means that Developer would always prefer for
Owner to accept the higher value in Period 1. However, note that as x gets closer to
2, 6 gets closer to infinity; this indicates that Developer would never offer apI = 96.
The advantage ofofferingpi > 94 is that Developer saves his cost of delay, butpi =
96 does not save Developer anything.
Part IV.A.2. Narrow Interpretation with a Low Valuation Owner
Explanation 6: Using the payoff equating method between bringing a
condemnation action and not bring the action yields
O(vD - C- cD) + (1 - 0)(-cD) = -4,
then solving for vD yields





Substituting the values assumed by the problem yields vD = 116.
Explanation 7: If Developer must condemn, then his payoff function is
(0.25)(v- C- 8) + (0. 75)(-8),
and substituting the given parameters and solving gives
(0.25) (175-100-8) + (0.75)(-8) = 10.75.
In Period 2, Developer will offer ap 2 such that
(vD-p2-- 2) > 10.75.
Solving forp 2 yields
p2 < vD - 12 .75,
and substituting 175 for vD gives
P2 < 162.25.
Explanation 8: Owner will never accept p2 < 94, because she will do better
defending against condemnation. Owner's payoff if Developer condemns is
(0.25)(100 - 100 - 6) + (0.75)(-6),
which simplifies to (-6). If Developer offers P2 > 94, whether Owner will accept
depends on how likely she thinks it is that Developer will condemn.
So Owner's expected payoff from rejectingp 2 > 94 is
(1 - y)(0) + y,(-6),
where y represents the probability that Developer will bring a condemnation action.
Setting the expected payoff of rejecting equal to that of accepting gives the equation
(1 - y)(0) + y(-6) = -6 + x,
and solving for y yields y = I - (x /6). This means that as y gets larger, Owner will
accept ap2 = 94 + x such that x is smaller.
Part IV.A.2. Narrow Interpretation with a High Valuation Owner
Explanation 9: Owner's payoff function, should Developer condemn the
property, is
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O(C- vo- co) + (I - O)(-o),
and substituting the set values gives
(0.25)(100 - 200 - 6) + (0. 75)(-6),
which simplifies to -31.
Explanation 10: Developer's payoff function if Developer chooses to
condemn is
(vD- C- cD) + (1 - 0)(-cD),
and substituting in the values, the function becomes
(0.25) (175-100-8) + (0.75)(-8) = 10.75.
Explanation 11: If Developer paid Owner's defense costs, then Owner's
payoff function from rejectingp 2 is
y[(.25)( C - vo - co) + (0. 75)(co)],
where y is the probability that Developer will condemn. Substituting the parameters
given and solving yields
y(0.25)(100 - 100 - 0) + (0.75)(0) = 0.
In Period 2, Owner will accept ap 2 such that
(p2- vo) > 0.
Solving forp 2 yields
P2> Vo,
and because vo = C,
P2> C.
Part IV.B. 1. Compensation Above Market Value with a Low
Valuation Owner
Explanation 12: Because 0 = 1, Developer's payoff function if he seeks
condemnation is (vD - C - cD). Developer will seek compensation if his payoff for
condemning is greater than that of not:
(vD - C - cD) >-4.
Solving for vD, it becomes apparent that Developer will condemn if
IMMINENTLY EMINENT
vD> C + CD-4.
Filling in the values set for the game (vD = 175; C = 150; CD = 8) yields the
statement
175>150+8-4,
which is a true statement, and Developer will therefore prefer to condemn rather
than let the deal fail.
Explanation 13: Owner's expected payoff from rejectingp 2 is
O(C- Vo - co) + (1 - O)(-co),
and substituting the given parameter and solving yields
(0.25)(100 - 100 - 6) + (0. 75)(-6) = -6.
In Period 2, Owner will accept ap 2 such that
(p2-vo) > -6.
Solving for p2 yields
P2> Vo- 6,
and substituting 100 for vo gives
P2 > 94.
Explanation 14: Consider a situation in which Developer offers a price greater
than market value but less than C- Co (Vo < P2 < C - co). Owner's Payoff function
for accepting P2 is
(P2 -vo),
which is a positive payoff. If owner rejects p2 her payoff function is
Y(0) + (1 - Y)( C- vo-co),
where y represents the probability that Developer will not condemn. The term (C-
co) can be rewritten as (p2 + x), where x > 0. Setting this payoff of rejectingp 2 equal
to the payoff of accepting yields
(1-)(P2 + X- Vo) (p2- vo).
Solving for y gives
Y = x / (p2 + x- vo),
which can be rewritten as
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y=x/(C-co-vo),
or substituting the known numbers
y = x / (44).
This means that as x gets closer to 44, then Owner will accept P2 only if the
probability that Developer will not condemn gets larger. This makes sense because
x represents the difference between C- co andp 2, and as it gets larger, it means that
p2 is getting smaller. For a small P2, Owner will only accept if the probability that
Developer will not condemn is large, and the more likely that Owner will end up
with a payoff of0. Because Developer does not know what Owner believes y to be,
Developer cannot estimate an x that Owner would accept, and thus Developer
would not offer a price below C - co.
Explanation 15: Owner's payoff from acceptingp 2 is
(P2 - vo),
and ifp2 = 144 and vo = 100, the payoff is a total of 44. Owner's payoff from
rejectingp 2 is
Y(O) + (1- ,W(C-v0o- co),
and if y> 0 then the payoff is
(1 - y)( 44),
which is less than the payoff of 44.
Part IV.B.2. Compensation Above Market Value with a High
Valuation Owner
Explanation 16: If Developer must condemn, then his payoff is
(vD-C-8) = (175-150-8) = 17.
In Period 2, Developer will offer ap 2 such that
(vD-p2-4) > 17.
Solving forp2 yields
p2 < vD- 21,
and substituting 175 for vD gives
P2 < 154 .
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Explanation 17: For example, if Developer offers p2 = 153, then Owner's
payoff from accepting is
(2 - Vo) =(153 - 200) = (-47).
If Owner rejects P2 = 153, her payoff is
(C- vo - u) = (150-200 + u) = (u - 50).
Ifu > 3, then (u - 50) > -47, and Owner will rejectp 2 and force Developer to incur
the costs of condemnation.

